Movement on the Harhoff Saga at the ICTY: an institution grasping at straws and a delusional judge

Today has seen a sudden flurry of activity in response to the disqualification of Judge Harhoff last week (see here and here). The Vice President has issued an order on the follow up to the decision, Judge Harhoff has filed a request for clarification and so have the two remaining judges on the trial chamber (Judges Lattanzi and Antonetti) and the Prosecutor has filed a motion for reconsideration.

This is a lot of information to digest, but just a couple of preliminary thoughts. I don't have much to say on the motion for reconsideration by the Prosecution. It essentially considers that the Panel made a misapplication of the standard for disqualification and erred in fact by making findings without evidence. I'm not sure this will go anywhere, but we will have to see.

• The Order from Judge Agius (acting President of the Tribunal)

The order considers that Rule 15, while providing for the nomination of a new judge, does not address the impact on a case. The decision is therefore taken to apply Rule 15bis which relates to the procedure to be followed in the absence of a judge for a long period of time. The choice is made because "in the interests of fairness and transparency, the procedures applicable under Rules 15bis(C) and 15bis(D) of the Rules ought to be applied to it mutatis mutandis", without much further explanation.

The relevant parts of this rule are the following:

(C) If a Judge is, for any reason, unable to continue sitting in a part-heard case for  a period which is likely to be longer than of a short duration, the remaining  Judges of the Chamber shall report to the President who may assign another  Judge to the case and order either a rehearing or continuation of the  proceedings from that point. However, after the opening statements provided  for in Rule 84, or the beginning of the presentation of evidence pursuant to  Rule 85, the continuation of the proceedings can only be ordered with the  consent of all the accused, except as provided for in paragraphs (D) and (G). 

(D) If, in the circumstances mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph (C), an  accused withholds his consent, the remaining Judges may nonetheless decide  whether or not to continue the proceedings before a Trial Chamber with a  substitute Judge if, taking all the circumstances into account, they determine  unanimously that doing so would serve the interests of justice. This decision  is subject to appeal directly to a full bench of the Appeals Chamber by either  party. If no appeal is taken from the decision to continue proceedings with a  substitute Judge or the Appeals Chamber affirms that decision, the President  shall assign to the existing bench a Judge, who, however, can join the bench  only after he or she has certified that he or she has familiarised himself or  herself with the record of the proceedings. Only one substitution under this paragraph may be made.

I'm not entirely convinced by the application of this rule to the current situation. For one, it's obviously not applicable. As Judge Agius acknowledges, this cannot be "strictly speaking be described as part-heard". This is an understatement, as the closing arguments concluded 18 months ago! Second of all, the situation here is very different because it is the result of a finding of partiality, so it cannot be business as usual. One has to consider whether the whole process is not viciated from the outset and whether an end of the proceedings is not the fairest solution for the accused. In this sense, I think it could have been perfectly possible for Rule 15 to apply, and for the newly constituted bench to decide proprio motu to put an end to the proceedings, or declare a mistrial, without needing 15bis.

This is in fact the most scandalous effect of the use of Rule 15bis: it takes off the table the possibility of just ending the proceedings as an abuse of process!

Low Morale at the ICTY

I just came across this article on the sense website about the morale of the staff at the ICTY, based on a survey taken among the Associate Legal Officers (ALOs) in June.

This is how the results are summarized :

“The morale of the staff in the Tribunal’s Chambers is at an all-time low. Many of the lawyers feel angry, sad, demoralized, betrayed, frustrated, powerless, undervalued and unappreciated, and also very distrustful of decisions coming from the President's office. The general feeling seems to be that President and his Office do not care about the Chamber's staff or the legacy of this institution but only about the completion strategy, the MICT (Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, which will carry out the residual tasks of the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), and their own personal interests.”

This certainly does not draw a happy picture of the atmosphere at the ICTY right now. If true, this is certainly interesting, but ultimately, highlights a number of features of the internal dynamics of the ICTY, and probably other international tribunals, which are not that surprising.

The charges levelled at the Presidency are particularly disturbing and if true, would warrant action far more than the unsubstantiated allegations put forward by Judge Harhoff some months ago, on which I commented on at the time (here and here).

Of course, one could adopt a demagogic position and minimize the results of this survey. Who cares about well-paid UN staffers in The Hague complaining about their work conditions, when thousands of victims in Yugoslavia are waiting for justice for the uncountable list of crimes committed against them? This would not be an entirely unfair statement to make but would ultimately be missing the point. Indeed, if one is attached to the process of international justice and efficient prosecutions for international crimes, then the institutions set up to meet that goal need to abide by certain minimum standards.

First of all, in this case the first rule of management seems to be ignored by the people at the top: keep your staff happy. There is no way that performance is not affected if the morale is so low. To put it bluntly, why would you bust your ass for an institution that shows so little disregard for you?

More importantly, the survey, beyond illustrating the personal difficulties of the staff, highlights some broader systemic difficulties at the ICTY, which ultimately also affects its performance and output.

For example, it illustrates the difficulties with the fact that there is no formal institutional link between the MICT and the ICTY. Indeed, beyond the fact that this is unfair to the current ICTY staff, I don’t see how hiring totally new people from the outside is a good idea, because this is the best way of losing the institutional memory that would lead to improved practices over the years.

In fact, this question goes well beyond the MICT. As anybody working in this field or The Hague for long enough can see, the turnover at the ICTY is incredibly high, with the result that it is likely that a number of people involved in the drafting of judgments probably never attended a single trial session. How course, one could tell me that as long as the Judges attended, then it is fine, because they are ultimately the ones deciding on the facts and the law. That is theoretically true, but so far removed from the reality of judgment drafting that it makes hardly any sense to approach things in this way. Indeed, there is no way that thousands of pages of judgments are prepared without the staff having some input in the way the evidence is understood and presented. As a result, this turnover means that there is no “case memory”, let alone institutional memory.

Finally, these allegations, beyond affecting the well-being of the ALOs, can, if true, only affect the legitimacy and credibility of the institution. Why, when all institutions in the world are increasingly being made accountable for practices of corruption, nepotism and lack of transparency as conditions for the legitimate exercise of authority, should the UN, and the ICTY in particular be exempt from these minimum principles?

On a final note, one issue raised in the article caught my attention:

Finally, as one of the respondents said, the ‘low morale is not helped by the recent appeal judgments, which are sending the message that no matter how voluminous, detailed or reasoned trial judgments are, they can be overturned in their entirety in a matter of few months, without much regard for the standard of review and in a 50 or so pages which contain very sparse reasoning’.

This is obviously a reference to the Gotovina Appeals Judgment and more generally to the recent acquittals, notably in the Perisic case. I will not restart the debate on the substance or merits of these acquitals, but I find it somewhat disconcerting that standards have been so warped at the ICTY, and in international justice generally, that a short judgment issued in a few months be considered as promoting « low morale ». For me, it is the thousand page judgment which it took years to draft that affect my morale…

A Visual Summary of my Thoughts on the Continued Harhoff/Meron "scandal"

This is arguably my shortest blog post ever, but, in addition to my more lenghty thoughts on the subject (here and here), I wanted to share my feeling about a lot of what has been written, and continues to be written on the Harhoff storm in a teacup.

H/T to Jens for mentioning the existence of this cartoon and to Thomas for sending it to me.

Follow up on the reactions to the Harhoff letter

[The first part of this post is here]

The letter by Judge Harhoff alledging that the President of the ICTY, Judge Meron, was acting on orders from the US in recent aquittals, or at least adopting legal positions to support US positions, has received some commentary since it was made public yesterday, from blogs such as this one and EJIL Talk!, but also in the New York Times, where an article reveals that a number of officials and judges at that ICTY share Judge Harhoff's skepticism and doubts about Judge Meron, to the point where another candidate has come forward to oppose the re-election of the latter at the Presidency. If these claims by the NY Times article are true, it seems that, if anything, Judge Harhoff has opened the floodgates of violating confidential information at the ICTY. Again, I don't know if this is a good or bad thing, but it finally gives outside observers something concrete to work with.

But, in relation to the substance, none of the comments I've read so far actually bring me any closer to knowing what went on. I'm seeing language typical of conspiracy theories: "hopefully we'll get evidence, and if there is no evidence, that means that someone is hiding things from us". It's a win-win situation for the conspirationists, because evidence either way can be construed as evidence of the existence of the conspiration. Also typical, is that there is a subtle shift of the burden of proof, as if those who don't buy into the conspiracy have to bring elements to disprove it. That's not how things should work. How do you prove that a spaceship did not land somewhere in the desert in the 1960s, leading to unhealthy experiments on alien beings?

In light of this, the only reasonable thing to do would be to just stop speculating until something concrete, other than a mere moral bias on the part of the critics (often relying on a somewhat simplistic, if not plainly wrong, analysis of the preceding case law), is revealed.

This being said, and because the temptation is just too big not to continue to debate pointlessly about this issue, I want to just share three thoughts that came up from reading the NY Times article.

First of all, there is the idea that there is a shift towards more deference to the military in the interpretation of the law in recent decisions. That might be true, but I would say that the anomaly was the previous shift away from that. For many years now, Human Rights activists have managed to convince way too many  people that International Humanitarian Law was merely a wartime branch of human rights law aimed only at protecting civilians, to the exclusion of any other consideration. But that was never true. IHL has always been a balance between the protection of non-combattants and military necessity. Forgetting the second branch of the balance has led to what Darryl Robinson has perfectly and brilliantly described as the identity crisis of international criminal law. In my view, it is therefore those who orchestrated that shift that had a political agenda, rather than those who would be returning this law to the traditional balance at the heart of IHL.

Second of all, there is this double idea that things didn't go well in Simatovic, because Judge Picard was not given enough time to write her dissent and because Orie was alledgedly also under influence. These are two different things. The first one is testimony, if true, of the fact that the ICTY has been under pressure, notably from the Security Council, for some years now to wind down its activities through the implementation of a rigorous completion strategy. And commentators have not generally been complaining about that. On the contrary, the ICTY has been regularly faulted for taking way too long to go through the trial process and the judgment drafting. It might be unfair that some judges today have to speed things up because previous generations of their colleagues were moving along at a leasurely pace, but I don't see the link with the issue at hand. As for Judge Orie, it should be pointed out that he appended to the Simatovic Judgment a rather surprising separate opinion that responds directly to Judge Picard's dissent and defends the majority judgment. I find this practice a little puzzling, but, beyond that, if Judge Orie was really under external pressure, why would he do that? It is one thing to give in to the pressure in the majority judgment, it is another entirely to go out on a limb to actually write a separate opinion with his sole name on it to defend the majority. This seems to indicate that, whatever one thinks of the majority Judgement, Judge Orie sincerely believes in it.

Finally, I am once again appalled at the narrative being constructed at the moment of the ICTY being a lenient court letting "murderers" get away. That is simply not true. On a long term perspective, the ICTY case law has developed principles that cast the net very wide, rather than very narrowly, through, for example, Joint Criminal Entreprise, command responsibility, or the adoption of rules of evidence that would make any national criminal lawyer laugh and cringe at the same time. Even in the short term,   nobody seems to recall that just a few weeks ago, the ICTY found 6 defendants guilty in the Prlic case, with a strong dissent from the Presiding Judge on the lack of evidence of a Joint Criminal Entreprise. Why is nobody talking about that?

At the end of the day, if we strip away the argumentative niceties and the unsubstantiated conspiracy theories, there remains a rather mundane, but fundamental dimension on international criminal justice: its bias towards convictions and the blatant disrespect for the rights of the defense and the principle of legality. When I hear certain people talk about international criminal justice, I sometimes wonder why they bother advocating for international criminal courts at all, when they seem intimately convinced that all defendants that will appear before them are necessarily guilty. I would have more respect for these activists if they stopped pretending to have a liberal agenda and clearly stated that we should dispense with the whole masquerade that are international trials to directly go to the sentencing phase, where the bad guys will finally get what they deserve.

Some Thoughts on The bombshell Letter by Judge Harhoff at the ICTY

[The follow up of this blogpost is here]

The news has spread since this morning like a virus. A Danish newspaper has revealed the existence of a letter sent to a list of 56 (!) friends by Judge Harhoff, a siting judge at the ICTY, claiming that the recent acquittals at the ICTY (Gotovina, Perisic, Stanicic and Simatovic) are the result of political pressure exerciced by the US and Israel on the American President of the Tribunal, Judge Meron, who in turn alledgedly influenced his fellow judges to increase the threshold of complicity so as to make convictions more difficult.

This letter is obviously incredible and brings up some thoughts on a number of levels.

• On the actual existence of the letter

First of all, if Judge Harhoff thought that this "confidential" message sent to a select number of his friends would not be made public, it shows a certain naivety. Moreover, one can question the propriety of such a letter. It seems to reveal internal information to the tribunal, in terms of the relationship between the judges that are most likely not meant to be made public.

This being said, the letter is obviously a useful tool for outside observers who rarely have access to publicly available information on the international dynamics within the tribunals, more specifically on the relationship between judges. In that sense, while probably formally improper, the letter is a welcome addition to anyone trying to understand how international criminal justice actually works, beyond the legal discussions on its output.

• The content of the letter

I will not delve into the actual substance of the debate on the "specific direction" test that is at the heart of the current controversy. Manuel Ventura published his take on this earlier this year on this blog, and the debate has been sparked up over at Opinio Juris, with recent posts by Kevin John Heller and James Stewart. I think it's ultimately a normative choice, with both sides having legitimate points to make.

I do however think that we need to distinguish the several dimensions of the allegations. 

The first one seems to be that some major powers have been putting pressure on Meron to interpret the law in such a way that some conduct not be regarded as complicity. I must admit that, probably naively, I don't quite buy it. The case law of these tribunals has, over the past 20 years, adopted a number of expansive interpretations of ICL to expand criminal liability of commanders, whether through the removal of causation in command responsibility or of course the creation of Joint Criminal Entreprise. This case law never bothered anyone at the state department, despite the impact that it could theoretically have on the criminal responsibility of commanders. But of course, if there is any evidence of "specific direction" (pun intended) from some countries to their judges to apply the law in a certain way, this would be contrary to the rule of independence and impartiality of the judges and would arguably warrant sanctions.

A second, somewhat different angle, is that of Judge Meron trying himself to change the judicial policy of the tribunal on those matters. If that is what happened, I don't see the problem, to put it bluntly. How is this any different than Cassese influencing the judicial policy of the tribunal with Joint Criminal Entreprise? Both have a normative agenda, and I refuse to take sides, on principle, between competing normative agendas, because one of them would be labelled as "moral" (i.e, good) while the other would be labelled as "political" (i.e, bad). The reason nobody was complaining at the time is of course that it is ok to stretch the law and the principle of legality and to have a normative agenda if the result is to put the bad guys behind bars. It suddenly becomes shameful when the result is acquittals. [CLARIFICATION: I'm not saying that I believe that Meron has a political agenda. I'm saying that even if he does have one, I don't necessarily see the problem. As others have argued (see UPDATE 2 below), the "specific direction" test predates by many years the current cases and it is not at all evident that Meron does in fact have a political agenda].

A third dimension is the alleged influence of Meron on other judges. This for me is the most hypocritical argument made in the letter. Of course judges influence other judges. That is the nature of deliberations and the reality of the tribunals. The history of ICTY benches is a history of some extremely competent people, but also a history of judges with serious deficiencies in character and in competence on issues of international law and international criminal law. Who could seriously claim that Antonio Cassese did not put "pressure" on some of his fellow judges to obtain certain things in judgments? Who could seriously claim more generally that deliberations are perfect egalitarian foras where the perfect legal truth emerges form pure argumentation? All deliberative bodies are the scene of power struggles, personal animosities and friendships which necessarily influence approaches to the substance of issues discussed, back-door compromises and negotiations. I don't see why ICTY Chambers would be any different. Once again, I did not hear Harhoff complain in the past of the possible intellectual influence of some judges over others.

• the impact of the letter

It is difficult at this point to gauge the possible impact of this letter, other than getting the little world of ICL commentators excited. In relation to Perisic and Gotovina, I wonder if there is any room for the Prosecutor to request a reconsideration of the Appeals Judgments in light of the allegations by Judge Harhoff. My sense is that, absent specific evidence of lack of impartiality on the part of Meron, this would be bound to fail. Also, it is possible that the Prosecutor will bring these issues up in the Simatovic appeal, maybe to ask for the removal of Judge Meron (and Gunay?) but again without concrete evidence, I don't see this going very far.

What about the impact on the outside world? Some might think that the legitimacy of the tribunal would be affected by such allegations. I really don't think so. First of all, the internal workings of the tribunal are, let's be honest, of interest to only a limited number of Hague nerdish commentators. Second of all, those who already think that the tribunal is illegitimate, will only think that their fears are confirmed. The affected communities never had much faith in the institution in the first place, and I don't see these new accusations as changing anything. The only community that might be concerned is the community of human rights activists, who, as Judge Harhoff, frown upon anything that might stand in the way of "ending impunity", be it politics, the rights of the defense or the principle of legality. 

Finally, what could be the consequences for Judge Harhoff himself? I can't see this being pushed under the rug. He is currently sitting on the difficult Sesejl case, but it is difficult to know if there is any link with the current debate until the judgment is issued. On a general level, there doesn't seem to be much respect on the part of the judge for the presumption of innocence, as he seems to have preconceived ideas about who should be found guilty or not. More generally, Judge Harhoff has explicitly singled out some of his colleagues and I can't see how this can make his work at the ICTY possible. A French politician some years ago said that a government minister should either shut up or get out if he disagrees with his government. I'm wondering if this should not apply to Judge Harhoff as a natural consequence of his doubts, whatever one thinks of them.

UPDATE 1: Over at EJIL Talk!, Marko Milanovic thinks that this is the "worst scandal to engulf the ICTY in its history". I'm really not that sure that it will be and if it really does turn out to be, I think it means that people seriously have their priorities wrong in what they should be focusing on in the work and output of the ICTY.

UPDATE 2: This recent blogpost over at Balkan Insight sheds some light on the fact that if there is a conspiracy theory, the case needs to be made in a far more convincing way given, among other things, the past use of the "specific direction" test in the case law. Ivanisevic argues rather convincingly that what has changed is not the political policy, but rather the fact pattern.

Guest Post: What the ICTY appeal judgment in Perišić means for the SCSL Appeals Chamber in Taylor

By Manuel J. Ventura

Director, The Peace and Justice Initiative

I’d like to begin by thanking Dov for giving up the space on his blog to allow me to post the following thoughts on the Perišić appeal judgment as it relates to Charles Taylor’s pending appeal at the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

During the closing trial arguments in the Perišić case, the following memorable in-court exchange was recorded between Presiding Judge Moloto and Senior Trial Attorney (now Co-Investigating Judge at the ECCC) Harmon. It is quoted at length because it goes to the very heart of why the Appeals Chamber overturned the convictions of Perišić – the highest ranking Yugoslav military officer during the time of his indictment – for aiding and abetting crimes committed by the VRS (Bosnian Serb Army) through the provision of substantial military support and assistance:

Judge Moloto: [M]y question is what is the authority for the proposition that, if an army assists another army in war and crimes are committed of the nature that are charged in this indictment, that the assisting army or commander of the assisting army is guilty of aiding and abetting those crimes?
Mr. Harmon: Your Honour, General Perišić provided assistance knowing that that assistance was going to assist the VRS [Bosnian Serbs] and it was likely that that assistance would be used in the commission of crimes.
Judge Moloto: Okay. Let me paint you an analogous scenario and get your comment on it. A war began in Afghanistan in 2001 and it is generally known that there are allegations of crime having been committed at least since 2002 to date. Does that make the commanders of the various NATO armies that are jointly participating in that war guilty of the crimes that are alleged to have been committed, and are still being committed, like detentions in Guantanamo, in Bagram, in Kabul and all these places?
Mr. Harmon: Your Honour, you are asking me obviously, an explosive political question.
Judge Moloto: No, no. It’s a legal question.
Mr. Harmon: I would like to answer your question. The objectives, as I understand, of the NATO forces isn’t to ethnically cleanse parts of Afghanistan. It is to be engaged in a military campaign against the Taliban. It is --
Judge Moloto: Mr. Perišić is not charged with ethnic[] cleansing. He is charged with murders. That’s why I’m making the distinction between the actual crimes that are charged in the indictment. […]
[snip]
Judge Moloto: […] [M]y question still stands, […] – what is the authority for that proposition and I’m saying can you comment on the – on the analogy that I’ve drawn because all the other commanders of the NATO nations that are involved in Afghanistan are aware of the kind of crimes that have been committed there and are still continuing with that war. It’s not a political question, it’s an analogous situation to this one.

Chutzpah at the ICTY: OTP motion to severe Mladic Indictment

I have been offline for a while now, too busy in the "real world" to blog on some of the issues that came up in recent months.

However, I couldn't really resist commenting on this piece of news: the ICTY Prosecutor filed a motion yesterday requesting a severance of the Mladic indictment to do two separate trials. This is the OTP's overview of its own motion:

1. The Prosecution seeks leave to: (a) sever the Second Amended Indictment (“Indictment”) against Ratko Mladic into two indictments (“Srebrenica” and “Sarajevo, Municipalities and Hostages”); (b) have the Srebrenica indictment tried first, followed by the Sarajevo, Municipalities and Hostages indictment [...]

2. The Prosecution has considered several options for proceeding against Mladic. Factors which have been taken into account include Mladic’s arrest at this late stage of the Tribunal’s mandate, the need to ensure justice for the victims, the desirability of commencing a trial as soon as possible, and the need to plan for the contingency that Mladic’s health could deteriorate. In the circumstances, severance of the Indictment and conducting two focused trials will best serve the interests of justice. 

3. Such an approach will maximise the prospect of justice for the victims, enable more effective management of the two separate trials and best allow the proceedings to be adapted in case of unforeseen contingencies. It is also consistent with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”) and will not unfairly prejudice the Accused’s rights.

Several brief thoughts :

1) On the substance of the indictments, the Prosecutor justifies the possibility of a severance by basically saying that there was no overarching Joint Criminal Entreprise (JCE) in Bosnia, contrary to what he had argued in the amended indictment of last June (§5):

Radovan KARADZIC and,  as of  12  May  1992,  Ratko  MLADIC,  were  key  members  of  an  overarching joint criminal  enterprise  which  lasted  from  at  least  October  1991  until  30 November  1995.  Their  objective  was  the  permanent  removal  of  Bosnian Muslims  and  Bosnian  Croats  from  Bosnian  Serb-claimed territory  in  BiH through crimes charged in this indictment.

The story now is that the JCE to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica is unrelated (or in the words of the Prosecutor "not part of" and "not a foreseeable consequence of") to the JCE to permanently remove all Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory. This basically looks like confirmation from the prosecutor that Srebrenica was a one-off genocidal event... or is it? because there are also counts of genocide under the proposed Municipalities indictment. So if I understand correctly, there is genocidal intent in both cases, but they are unrelated... I find that a little confusing. As Professor Schabas was quoted saying in a recent Economist article: "either there was a general bid to exterminate or there was not" and severing the two seems extremely artificial.

2) I won't really comment on the practical justifications given by the prosecutor to hold two trials instead of one (interests of justice, interests of victims, manageability...). One can only wonder why, if these issues are so important, this has not been the practice in the past? I was under the impression that the ICTY was always acting in the interests of justice and of the victims, and that the efficient administration of justice was a permanent key consideration for the Court. But I must have been mistaken.

3) What puzzles me the most is the Procedure and timing of the motion. As the Prosecutor's immediate recourse to "inherent powers doctrine" shows (§21 of the motion), there is no actual textual basis for the severance in the founding documents. I generally don't like the use of this shaky doctrine by international criminal tribunals, but let's play along for the sake of argument.
The real issue is timing. I find that this motion shows the  chutzpah of the Prosecutor, and ultimately of the ICTY, should the severance be accepted. Indeed, let's look at the timeline for a second. The first indictment against Mladic was filed some 15 years ago.The Prosecutor, filed an revised indictment in May 2010, which was only approved nearly a year on in May 2011, so that gave him time to reconsider his approach. More importantly, Mladic was rushed through the initial appearance (with the playing-to-the-media-i'm-reading-ALL-the-charges show from Judge Orie)  and the ridiculously hasty pleading proceedings (with the removal of Mladic from the courtroom at his own request), his request for additional time to read and understand the charges having been denied. Everything was rushed along, probably in the "interests of justice". And now, the Prosecutor suddenly decides to change his mind and hold 2 trials, because of these same "interests of justice"? Whatever the practical merits of that solution, I find the Prosecutor's conduct quite careless, especially in light of the ICTY's attitude towards Mladic, which seems to indicate that a Court having conducted dozens of trials is suddenly having first date jitters when it comes to this defendant.

4) On a final and related note, I'm still in favour, at least in theory, of joining the Karadzic and Mladic trials, especially if Srebrenica is tried separately. On top, from what I understood, the Karadzic Chamber has not even started hearing evidence on Srebrenica (someone correct me if I'm wrong). As I've said elsewhere, these this is essentially the same case, from a narrative point of view. If the "interests of justice" are so important, then I believe both cases should indeed be joined.

The ICTY prepares for Mladic

As the procedure for Mladic's extradition continues in Serbia and questions of his fitness for trial arise, the ICTY awaits his arrival eagerly.

First of all, the judges for the Trial Chamber have been assigned. Among them is Dutch Judge Alphonse Orie, which is interesting, given the Netherlands' ambiguous role in Srebrenica. It is also ironic that a Dutch judge will be a part of accountability for what happened there, given that the a Dutch court decided in 2008 that the Netherlands were not responsible for what happened because they were under UN command, and that the UN itself could not be sued before a national court because of its immunity, thus removing all means of reparations for victims.

Second of all, the Court granted the Prosecutor's request to amend the Mladic indictment, which he had filed... over a year ago! One could of course cynically think that the imminent arrival of Mladic explains the sudden interest for a request which has likely been buried in the "to do" box for a year... But the professionalism that defines the work of the ICTY should guard us from such cynicism and the delay probably only means that the judge has been extremely thorough in reviewing the request and its accompanying documents.

Third of all, as predicted in my previous post, Karadzic's counsel has raised the issue of the effect of Mladic's arrest on the Karadzic trial, and the question of whether a suspension and joinder might be an option.

BREAKING NEWS: Mladic apparently arrested!

The press is announcing that war crimes suspect Radko Mladic has been arrested in Serbia. The president of Serbia has confirmed this information in a press conference. He claims that this "closes a chapter" in the history of Serbia and its cooperation with the ICTY (although he did mention that Hadzic is still out there). I think this is wishful thinking. Because 1) the turbulent history of the Balkans and Serbia's role in it will not just disappear with Mladic's rendition to the ICTY. There will be a long trial which will delay any closure for many years. and 2) is sending Mladic for trial in The Hague really the way to deal with the past? I know that the ICTY has primacy over the case, but if I were Serbia, I would actually fight that and request to try him, under international supervision, in Serbia. The trial would definitely have more meaning in my opinion.

It will also interesting to hear the world leaders praise the arrest and the fact that Maldic will be brought to justice... just weeks after they praised the killing of Bin Laden as "justice being done"...

Finally, it will of course be important to see the effect of the arrest on ongoing cases at the ICTY. Let's see Mladic, for example, prove that he is not the author of the diaries that were entered into evidence in a number of cases. Also, if I were Karadzic's counsel, I would request a suspension of his trial and a joinder of cases, given the JCE that is claimed against both of them. That would create quite a procedural mess...

Follow-up on French Karadzic Decision

In support of my argumentation on the role of the interaction between French civil courts and the ICTY, and the suggested idea that French civil courts should suspend their decision under a verdict is achieved, I have come across rule 106 of the ICTY RPE on the compensation for victims:

(A) The Registrar shall transmit to the competent authorities of the States concerned the judgement finding the accused guilty  of a crime which has caused injury to a victim.
(B) Pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim or persons claiming through the victim may bring an action in a national court or other competent body to obtain compensation.
(C) For the purposes of a claim made under paragraph (B) the judgement of the Tribunal shall be final and binding as to the criminal responsibility of the convicted person for such injury.

This Rule, particularly paragraph (C) supports the claim that there is a functional link between the ICTY and national courts, not merely a factual one. One could of course wonder whether the judges in the RPE, in the absence of any explicit statutory provision on compensation for victims, or the effect of ICTY judgments in national legal orders, can actually be deemed to have adopted this rule ultra vires. However, the Rule indirectly finds support in the non bis in idem provision of the Statute (article 10), which provides that

No person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or she has already been tried by the International Tribunal. 

One can therefore argue, as I did in my previous post, that, to the extent that ICTY judgments are deemed to have a clear legal effect in national systems, i.e, be just as binding as a national criminal judgment would be, ongoing international criminal proceedings can have the corresponding same effect than national criminal proceedings, i.e. suspend civil proceedings until the conclusion of the trial, especially given the impossibility of concurrent French criminal proceedings.

This certainly raises interesting questions on the interactions between legal orders, the international and the national one, and more importantly the porosity between the two. Any comments are as usual welcome.

[UPDATE: One member of Karadzic's legal team has reacted (unsurprisingly) to reject the French decision. He considers that the decision is "illegal" because, just to cover all angles, 1) there is no guilty verdict by the ICTY, 2) anyway there is no link between what he is tried for and what  the facts considered by the French Court and 3) that the Court has no jurisdiction to decide whether a defendant is guilty of war crimes. I hope he is more efficient in his defense of Karadzic because his reasoning is notably unconvincing. Indeed, if there is no link between what the Paris court ruled upon and the charges at the ICTY, then there is actually no obstacle for the French Court to independently rule on the facts before it. Moreover, there is a double inaccuracy in his third point: a) of course a French Court has material competence over war crimes, from its own criminal code, especially as there is a clear personal link with the nationality of the victims and b) in any case, it is a civil decision, so technically Karadzic was not found guilty of war crimes.
In any case, the question of the link between the two procedures is interesting. Indeed, my reasoning is based in the assumption that there is such a link between the harm the plaintiffs claimed in France and ICTY charges. This assumption is based on the apparently explicit referral to ICTY proceedings by the French tribunal. But if in fact, there is no link, then my argument, of course does not hold. I'm still trying to get hold of the decision to verify this.]

French civil Court orders Karadzic to compensate Bosnian Family

According to an AFP report, the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris has ordered Radovan Karadzic and Biljana Plavsic to pay 200 thousand euro in compensation to a Bosnian family living in France since the war. The Court found itself incompetent to consider the case against Krajisnic (the report does not say why) and requested additional information against Mladic.

In relation to Plavsic, the Court apparently relied on her conviction for crimes against humanity by the ICTY to find that she had committed faults in relation to the plaintiffs' damage. One should recall that at the time, that case had created quite a stir because she had plea bargained her way to getting the genocide charges dropped.

As for Karadzic, whose trial is still ongoing, the Court found that (rough translation from the AFP report): "the simple fact that no definitive conviction has been reached cannot justify the status quo, which would necessarily create unjustified additional delays for the victims. The judges referred to the right of a victim of  manifest human rights violations to an adequate, useful and swift recourse".

I'll be careful of drawing too many conclusions from a news report (journalists are not necessarily known for their adequate reporting of legal news), but just a few thoughts.

First of all, I'm not aware of any such decisions before, of a civil claim against a current ICTY indictee (if my readers have any information on this...).

[UPDATE: Apparently Karadzic was also the object of civil proceedings in the United States in 2000, while still a fugitive and ordered by a jury to pay compensation. The article raises the question of whether the Republika Srpska could be held liable to pay the reparations, given that Karadzic himself most likely does not have sufficient funds. Also, French courts are definitely less favourable to plaintiffs: the 200.000 euro awarded in Paris seems like chump change compared to the 4,7 billion dollars awarded in the US...]

Second of all, I'm a little puzzled by the procedure. The Court's affirmation that the absence of a criminal conviction is no reason not to go forward is in that respect interesting. For one, from the point of view of French law, there is, if I recall correctly a principle that "le pénal tient le civil en état", which translates roughly as "criminal proceedings hold civil proceedings still". This basically means that when both criminal proceedings and civil proceedings are ongoing, the civil court must wait for the criminal court to decide. Of course, there are not formal criminal proceedings going on in France, so you could say that the rule does not apply. However, the primacy of the ICTY over national jurisdictions actually bars any criminal proceedings for the same crimes in France, so in a way, Karadzic, being tried under a Chapter VII mandate by the ICTY in tried in the name of France. It seems like a convenient way to skirt around the primacy rule, to initiate civil proceedings when criminal ones are not possible.

Finally, I'm struck by the finding of the Court that "manifest" human rights violations require a particularly swift remedy. I was unaware that "human rights" had a different role in French tort law, or in tort law in general (nor what the qualifier "manifest" means for that matter). Why should human rights victims get better recourse than any other plaintiff before a civil Court? This is once again the sign of the way Human Rights has taken over so many branches of law and where moral considerations take over legal reasoning. But that is, I suppose, a different issue...

I'll try and get hold of the decision and keep you posted if there is anything interesting in it.

ICTY: an international armed conflict existed in Kosovo during NATO bombings

Today, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY convicted Vlastimir Dordevic for crimes committed in Kosovo. One thing that struck me when reading the summary of the Judgment, is this statement of the Chamber:

In addition, on 24 March 1999 NATO commenced military operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so that the Chamber is also satisfied that from 24 March 1999, until the end of hostilities in June 1999, an international armed conflict existed in Kosovo between Serbian forces and the forces of NATO.

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that any international court or tribunal has actually legally qualified the nature of the military operation of NATO in Kosovo in 1999. Serbia's case before the ICJ was rejected on grounds of admissibility and the corresponding case before the ECHR was also rejected at the admissibility phase. As for the ICTY, The Limaj and Haradinaj indictments did not cover the NATO bombing period. In Sainovic, despite the indictment covering that period, the Chamber found that: "Thus, there was an armed conflict between the FRY and the KLA leading up to and into the period of the NATO air campaign" (Judgment, §841). Milosevic does not help either, because the 98bis decision only looked at the existence of an armed conflict prior to the beginning of the bombings. Finally, the OTP report released in 2000 which advised against initiating an investigation for NATO actions, makes absolutely no mention of this aspect.

I need to read the full Judgment in order to understand why the Trial Chamber actually felt compelled to make this statement, i.e., whether the nature of the armed conflict actually makes a difference in relation to the crimes charges, or if this finding is merely the chamber straying into obiter dictum territory.

In any case, it's an interesting finding on many levels. Specifically in relation to the bombing itself, it raises once again the issue of NATO's humanitarian law obligations during the operation.
More generally, it puts on the table once again the issue of the impact of external actors on the nature of a conflict. Of course one could argue that this is a case-specific finding, in light of the fact that NATO was not acting under Chapter VII authorization.
On this point, I see in some of the literature a distinction between civil wars where a neighboring State intervenes in favor of one side or another, thus making it an international armed conflict, and international intervention based on humanitarian purposes, by the UN for instance, which is therefore seen as not changing the nature of the conflict because of an alleged neutrality of the third party. The rationale for this distinction is thus a question of 1) political motivation and 2) UN authorization. I would however argue against the distinction.
In relation to political motivation, I believe that political neutrality is a fiction. When the UN, or any other organisation, intervenes to stop a genocide it is definitely taking sides against the perpetrators. It might have legitimate human rights reasons to do so, but one cannot deny that this also has dire internal political repercussions. In this sense, I would disagree with the preliminary finding of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Abu Garda confirmation of charges that the conflict in Sudan was an armed conflict not of an international character. From the moment that a peacekeeping force is materially preventing two sides to a conflict from fighting, they are factually participants to the conflict.
In relation to the Chapter VII authorization, I don't see how that should have an effect on the nature of the situation, it is only relevant to the jus ad bellum issue of the legality of the intervention.

With this in mind, I would argue that any external intervention in an internal armed conflict, which has a military component to it makes the conflict an international one. In this sense, I would argue that the Court's finding, irrespective of the issue of the legality of the intervention itself, in the absence of a UN Chapter VII authorization, could generally apply to UN-sanctioned interventions as well.

Obviously, one could consider that the point I'm making is not that important, from a practical point of view. Indeed, however one qualifies the armed conflict, the fact remains that outside actors such as the UN consider that they are bound by the substantial obligations of IHL.
But I believe it is a fundamental point for several reasons. For one, we should lose this illusion of the neutral good samaritan. Factually, any involvement in an armed conflict is a political act, irrespective of the motives. Moreover, conceptually, keeping external actors outside the legal framework masks the ever-changing reality of armed conflict, which is, on the one hand increasingly less "international" in the traditional Twentieth Century understanding of the term and mostly internal, but which, on the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically,increasingly and more and more systematically, involves an international component, through various types of peacekeeping operations.
This new reality of international participation in the hostilities should be acknowledged and the application of IHL to peacekeepers should not depend on the goodwill of the organisation, but on their direct applicability of the conventions as a matter of law.
In relation to that, I'm in favor of the end of UN immunity before national jurisdictions, which even covers war crimes, as the Srebrenica case in the Netherlands showed. It is extravagant that the organisation that imposes on countries not to provide amnesties or immunities for international crimes, should protect itself in that way. But it is now me who is straying off topic and into obiter dictum territory...

Sljivancanin Review Judgment at the ICTY

[UPDATE: here is a link to the Review Judgment, which should be online soon]

It's a hectic day for international tribunals. The ICC held the confirmation of charges hearing for two sudanese rebels, Banda and Jerbo (see press release). More to the north, the ICTY Appeals Chamber was rendering its Review Judgment in the Sljivancanin case. Unfortunately, both took place at the same time. Because confirmation of charges take hours, I watched the ICTY hearing and will check out the confirmation of charges later tonight.

I've blogged several times on the ongoing review proceedings of the Appeals Judgment in the Sljivancanin case. Last December, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the motion for revision of the Appeals Judgment by which it had reversed one of the findings of acquital. In July this year, the Appeals Chamber granted the motion to review the Appeals Chamber Judgment based on new facts. Basically, the AC had considered, based on circumstantial evidence, that the Defendant must have been given elements in a conversation that would prove the required mens rea for aiding and abetting murder as a war crime. The new witness that came forward alleged that no such information was exchanged in that specific  conversation. The following comments are based on the hearing (here is the Judgment summary).

The AC first rejected all the Prosecution submissions contesting the credibility of witness and found that the new fact did in fact prove that the required mens rea was not present for the crime under consideration. The AC therefore vacated the additionationl conviction, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The AC then quashed the sentence of 17 years imposed in the Appeals Judgment, reducing it to 10 years. There is a dissenting opinion of Judge Pocar (probably calling for remanding the case to the trial chamber for sentencing...) and separate opinions from judges Gunay and Meron.

The first thing to point out, which is already notable in itself for international tribunals, is that everything went as planned. No "however" coming at a late stage of the judgment to justify not taking into account the new evidence, no procedural sidestep to justify a longer prison sentence. All in a all, a simple and logical judgment.

Hearing it, I couldn't help reflect once more on the mess this procedure turned out to be, even if the miscarriage of justice was avoided in the end, because of the actions of the AC. As I pointed out in previous blogs, we have just witnessed the compound effect of what are, in my opinion, debatable legal choices. 1) I don't think that the AC should be allowed to reverse acquittals 2) if it is allowed to do so, it should not be allowed to "re-judge" the case, and it should be remanded to the trial chamber which is the trier of facts and 3) we have clearly seen the limits of the use of "circumstantial evidence" and "reasonable inferrence" ; indeed, in effect we just witnessed a de facto reversal of the presumption of innocence and corresponding burden of proof, with the AC making a finding based on nothing, and the Defendant having to provide evidence to prove his innocence...

One last point is the question of sentencing. It seems to be such an arbitrary procedure. The Presiding judge clearly states that the sentence for the torture conviction took into account the additional murder conviction, thus justifying today's reduction. But we have two different crimes and I believe there shouldn't be such a link between the two sentences. It's about time, as I've said before, that we stop pretending that there is no hierarchy in international crimes, which in effect creates arbitrariness, and call for a clear scale of sentences in relation to each crime, as any mature system of criminal law should contain.
[UPDATE: There is of course the issue of the powers of the AC itself to increase a sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber. As pointed out by Judge Pocar in his (consistent) dissent on this issue, it is contrary to fundamental human rights for the AC to have this power, because there is no appeal of the new sentence by the Defendant. He would have therefore confirmed the original 5 year sentence, without any increase.]